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Introduction:
With the 2011 enactment of major pension reform legislation in New Jersey, legal
questions regarding the rights of public employees to their benefits have been brought to the
forefront of public debate. A state-by-state analysis shows that there is a wide variety of
approaches to the central legal question raised by all pension reform efforts: when and how can a
state make changes to its public employee pension programs? The answers can be found in the
common law, state and federal constitutions, as well as questions of statutory construction, and
legislative intent. Since 2009, New Jersey legislators have taken steps to implement a new
scheme for pension plans, retirement plans, and collective bargaining rights for public
employees. Their efforts culminated on June 28, 2011, when Governor Chris Christie signed
Senate Bill 2937 into law. 1 Due to some of the changes imposed by 2011 P.L. Ch. 78 2 (“2011
Pension Reform Legislation"), public employee unions have initiated litigation against the state. 3
New Jersey Senate President Stephen Sweeney (D. Gloucester) helped lead in the
passage of the legislation after building bipartisan support for the sweeping changes set forth in
the bill. The Act repeals or amends over eighty laws and significantly alters public employee
pension, retirement, and healthcare plans. 4 Notably, the law raises the age of retirement for some
individuals, alters the amount of employee contributions, and eliminates the cost-of-living
adjustment. 5 While the purpose and effect of the law are in dispute, the Legislature holds that it
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1
Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee Statement to Senate, No. 2937, 2011 Leg., 214th Sess. 2 (N.J. 2011)
[hereinafter Committee Statement].
2
2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 78 (West).
3
See Bill Wichert, Dems Attacking Christie Allies Over State Union Setbacks, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 15, 2011, at 003,
available at 2011 WLNR 16153221; see also Complaint, N.J. Educ. Assoc. v. State, No. 3:11-CV-0502 (D.N.J.
filed Aug. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 3850262 [hereinafter Complaint].
4
See 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 78 (West).
5
Committee Hearings, supra note 1.

2

amended the law to comply with federal and state tax regimes and treasury regulations. 6 The law
is meant to cut costs, although public employees allege that the new law continues the State’s
practice of underfunding the pension system. 7 The New Jersey Education Association, along
with other interested parties, filed a complaint in federal court on August 31, 2011. 8 This Note
will analyze the possibility of success in this litigation and propose an alternative approach to
pension reform enactment that is more consistent with New Jersey law. 9
This Note analyzes the recent reform in New Jersey and subsequent litigation to propose
that the state adopt a concrete, contractual approach to reform, where legislators can
prospectively alter pension law, but will be estopped from making retroactive changes. Part I of
this Note will provide background information on federal and state regulation of pension
benefits, and discuss case law analyzing prior pension reform efforts in New Jersey and in other
states. Part II will provide general background information on pension reform and analyze
specific details of New Jersey’s 2011 Pension Reform Legislation. Finally, Part III will analyze
the New Jersey litigation by looking at the policy considerations likely to guide the court, the
legal merits of the claims asserted, and the likelihood of success. Additionally, Part III will
suggest that New Jersey adopt a bright-line contract theory-based approach to pension reform
that sets out to only make prospective changes to the law, to avoid future contract-based
challenges from employees.

6

Id.
Complaint, supra note 3.
8
Id.
9
See N.J. Educ. Assoc. v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. 2010); see also Prof’l Firefighters’ Assoc. of N.J. v.
State, No. A-3681-08T3 (N.J. Super. Aug. 23, 2011).
7
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I. Background on Regulation of Pension Benefits in the United States and New Jersey and
Application in Case Law
Pension plans for private and public employees are regulated differently. 10 Federal laws,
including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue
Code generally govern private employee pensions and benefits, and state laws generally govern
plans for state and local government employees. 11 While regulation varies among states, in some
cases drastically, federal law does sometimes also provide for the protection of public employee
benefits. 12 Additionally, both public and private pensions are subject to federal constitutional
constraints.
Before discussing the specifics of federal and state regulation of employee benefits, it is
necessary to provide background on the most common types of pension plans. Defined benefit
plans allow for employees to receive a monthly payment for life once they retire, as provided by
in a defined formula. 13 Funding for these types of plans may come from employee and/or
employer contributions, stock, or other investment returns. 14 Actuaries are typically responsible
for setting the contribution rates for these plans and making sure that the financial risk of such a
plan is properly calculated. 15
In contrast to the defined benefit plan, the defined contribution plan does not ensure
regular monthly payments for the employee, but instead accrues contributions that are stored in
an account from which the employee may withdraw, in full if he desires, upon retirement. 16

10

Anna K. Selby, Pensions in a Pinch: Why Texas Should Reconsider its Policies on Public Retirement Benefit
Protection, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2011).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 1215.
14
Id.
15
Selby, supra note 10 at 1215-16.
16
Id. at 1217.
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Recently, some states have stopped offering definite benefit plans, and instead offered alternative
defined contribution plans, or combination plans. 17
To receive benefits from either type of plan, an employee must obtain legal rights to the
payments. 18 This process is known as “vesting,” which “confers upon an employee a ‘complete
and consummated right not contingent upon any future event.’” 19 Depending on the plan, an
employee may vest his rights to benefits after a particular period during his employment. 20
Whether an employee has vested his rights to benefits may impact the amount and nature of the
contributions he can receive. 21 The type of plan and whether or not it creates a vested right to
benefits are extremely important factors when examining the legal issues raised by state pension
reform efforts.
a. New Jersey
Pension plans and retirement benefits are regulated by New Jersey’s state constitution
and in Titles 18 and 43 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. Additionally, pensions for public
employees are subject to New Jersey’s Contract Clause. 22 Title 18 of New Jersey Statute governs
Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund Law (TPAF) 23 and Title 43, Chapter 15A governs the
Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). 24

17

Robert L. Clark, State and Local Pensions in the United States, Prepared for Workshop on Civil Service and
Military Pension Arrangements, 11, January 20-21, 2011, available at http://cis.ier.hitu.ac.jp/Japanese/society/conference1101/clark-paper.pdf.
18
Selby, supra note 10 at 1217.
19
Id. at 1218 (citing Dan M. McGill, Preservation of Pension Benefit Rights 7, 5 (1972)).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 states: “The Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed
when the contract was made.”
23
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:66-1 (West 2011).
24
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A (West 2011).
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Additionally, the New Jersey Legislature has amended pension statutes through yearly
public laws. 25 For instance, New Jersey P.L, 1997, ch. 113 adopts a contract theory-based
approach to pension reform, but only guarantees “non-forfeitable right[s]” to “vested” retirees
and sets out the state’s responsibility to contribute “annual normal contribution[s.]” 26 However,
Chapter 113 also reserved control for the Legislature by stating that it would “not preclude the
forfeiture, suspension or reduction of benefits for dishonorable service[.]” 27 Over the past ten
years, the Legislature has altered eligibility requirements, actuarial formulas, and employer
contributions to the public pension system. 28
i. Case Law in New Jersey under a Contract Clause Analysis
New Jersey courts have historically been reluctant to overturn pension reform legislation.
In Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Commission, 29 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that pension reform which resulted in minor alterations to retirement
eligibility requirements did not constitute a contractual impairment or taking. 30 The court
reasoned that there was no explicit indication that the legislation would create a contractual
obligation with the members of the fund. 31 Instead the court held, “the terms and conditions of
public service in office or employment rest in legislative policy rather than contractual
obligation, and hence may be changed except of course insofar as the State Constitution

25

Recent Legislation, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, DIVISION OF PENSION AND BENEFITS
(Sept. 29, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.nj.gov/treasury/pensions/newlaw11.shtml.
26
N.J.P.L. 1997, ch. 113.
27
The law states that employees’ rights to their pension will not restrict the State from amending the retirement
system with future legislation. Recent Legislation: Chapter 113, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, DIVISION OF PENSION AND BENEFITS (Sept. 29, 2011, 4:03 PM),
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/lawsfy97.shtml#ch113.
28
N.J.P.L 2003, ch. 108.
29
Spina v. Consol. Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169 (S. Ct. NJ 1964).
30
Id. at 170.
31
Id.
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specifically provides otherwise.” 32 However, the court refused to adopt a defined approach to
pension benefits, referring to contributions as “compensation,” “reward[,]” and
“noncompensatory payment to further the public employer's own interests[.]” 33 Ultimately, Spina
declares that the legal question of pensions as a contractual obligation, property interest, or
perhaps some form of gratuity does not require detailed analysis, as the issue is “too academic to
be pursued, for our Legislature would not think of making off with a fund.” 34 Expanding on the
nature of pensions described in Spina, the court in Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, acknowledged
pension plans as a kind of deferred compensation meant to provide necessary security for
employees. 35 The Court noted the particular importance of protecting pension for public
employees to protect “employment stability and financial security.” 36
Forty years after Spina, in New Jersey Education Association v. State, 37 members of the
state’s teachers union and pension fund unsuccessfully pushed for constitutional protection for a
contract right to their pensions under TPAF. 38 While the lower court found that the State was
contractually obligated to provide funding for the pension system as a matter of law, plaintiffs
did not bear their burden to show a substantial impairment that would violate the State and
Federal Contract Clauses. 39 Plaintiffs alleged that from 2004-2007, the Legislature underfunded
the fund by $2.6 billion, but the court found that evidence of such underfunding was
unsubstantiated. 40 The court also found that TPAF members did not have a contractual right to
the “manner or method” of funding in the system, and thus did not satisfy the second prong of

32

Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
34
Spina, 197 A.2d at 175.
35
Uricoli v. Bd. of Tr., 449 A.2d 1267, 1273 (N.J. 1982).
36
Id.
37
N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 989 A.2d 282 (N.J. Super. 2010).
38
Id. at 283.
39
Id. at 284.
40
Id. at 287.
33

7

the analysis. 41 In articulating this holding, the court cited the established rule, “a statute will not
be presumed to create private, vested contractual rights, unless the intent to do so is clearly
stated.” 42 Citing Spina, the court affirmed that New Jersey defers to legislative intent, and though
the state recognizes employees’ property interest in earned benefits, it does not recognize a
contractual obligation to ensure that pensions are paid in a certain way unless legislation clearly
explicates such intent. 43 While “non-forfeitable right to receive benefits,” as stated in the statute,
does create a contractual obligation for the state to provide those benefits to public employees, an
employee’s right does not extend to the management of those funds. 44
Finally, in the most recent ruling concerning this matter, Professional Firefighters
Association of New Jersey v. State, 45 several unions brought suit against the state in response to
2003 legislation altering the pension scheme under PFRS by decreasing employer contribution
rates. 46 While plaintiffs argued that the state should treat employees’ rights to pensions as a
contract, the court ultimately followed New Jersey Education Association by rejecting the
theory. 47 This court clarified, “[u]nlike many other states, our constitution does not expressly
create a contractual right to retirement benefits . . . We will not recognize such a right unless it is
‘so plainly expressed that one cannot doubt the individual legislator understood and intended
it.’” 48
New Jersey courts are resistant to acknowledge a public employee’s interest in his
pension as a contractual right, despite examining challenges to pension reform under the

41

Id. at 284.
Id. at 292 citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santé Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-466
(1985).
43
N.J. Educ. Ass’n, 989 A.2d at 296-297.
44
Id. at 297.
45
Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of N.J. v. State, No. A-3681-08T3 (N.J. Super. Aug. 23, 2011).
46
Id. at 1.
47
Id. at 3.
48
Id. at 4 quoting Spina v. Consol. Police and Firemen’s Pension Fund Comm’n, 197 A.2d 169 (S. Ct. NJ 1964).
42
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established Contract Clause analysis. As such, New Jersey seems to adopt a hybrid-approach to
pension benefits, which combines gratuity, property right, and contract theories of pension law.
Consequently, public employees and employers subject to pension reform in New Jersey suffer
from a lack of consistently interpreted and uniform law.
b. State Approaches
While ERISA, the Tax Code, and § 302 of the NLRA broadly protect some aspects of
employees’ rights to benefits, some states have gone far to create regional regulation for public
employees. There is a great deal of variation among states’ regulation of pensions and benefits.
To understand the nature and scope of various states legislation of pension benefits, it is
necessary to provide a background on the theoretical approaches to pensions in a legal
framework. There are at least four theories defining the nature of an employee’s right to pension
benefits, including pension as gratuity, as contract, as property right, and under promissory
estoppel. 49
i. Pension as Gratuity
The theory of pension as gratuity treats public pension plans as gifts, rather than as
contracted terms or compensation. 50 Therefore, under this theory, pension plans could be altered
or eliminated at any time without redress by the employee. 51 In a gratuity jurisdiction, an
employee does not have vested rights in his pension plan, so the Government may amend the
plan freely. 52 Additionally, an employer may expressly state in its contract with the employee
that the benefits are treated as gratuities and as such, the employer may dismiss the employee at

49

Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES, No. 10-13. 2010.
50
Id. at 3.
51
Id.
52
John Martinez, 2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 10:39 (Sept. 2011).
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any time without having to confer the benefits through the plan. 53 For corporate entities in New
Jersey, voluntary pension plans that the employee does not contribute to do not create contractual
obligations, but are treated as gratuities, and the employee does not hold vested rights until he
has actually received benefits. 54 The gratuity approach has been rejected by most states based on
constitutional conflicts or policy changes; however Indiana, Texas, and Arkansas still adhere to
this approach to some extent. 55
ii. Pension as Contract
Contractual jurisdictions suggest that a pension plan creates a contract between the entity
and the employee. 56 The contract may be implied by the circumstances of employment or
explicitly declared by state constitution. 57 Modifications to a pension plan are applied in a
contract law context. 58 When the contract is implied, the court must look to the United States
Constitution’s Contract Clause, or the state constitution’s version. 59
The Contract Clause prohibits states from passing legislation that impairs existing
contracts, whether they are public or private. 60 Determining whether amending employee
pension plans or benefits violates the Contract Clause requires a three-step analysis. First, the
court must examine whether a contractual relationship exists.61 It must then determine whether
the change in law constitutes a substantial impairment to the employee’s rights. 62 Finally, it must

53

W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Rights and Liabilities as between Employer and Employee with Respect to General
Pension or Retirement Plan, 42 A.L.R. 2d 461 (1955).
54
William Meade Fletcher, Employee Benefit Plans, in 6 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS,
ch. 24, § 2522.10; see also Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 104 A.2d 860 (N.J. Super. 1954).
55
Monahan, supra note 49 at 3.
56
Shipley, supra note 53 at ch. II, § 4.
57
Monahan, supra note 49 at 3.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
61
Terry A.M. Mumford, Mary Leto Pareka, Ice Miller Donado & Ryan. The Employer’s (In) Ability to Reduce
Retirement Benefits in The Public Sector, SC14 ALI-ABA 27, 35 (1997).
62
Id.
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determine if the impairment is reasonable and necessary to achieve the Government’s goals. 63
Effectively, states adhering to the contract theory are limited in their reform options because of
the stricter constitutional analysis.
Within the contract theory approach, there are three general directions a state may take
when offering protection. First, a state may provide constitutional protection of past and future
benefit accruals. 64 Under this approach, adopted in New York, Alabama, Illinois, and Arizona,
states have the greatest challenge in successfully reforming pension rights. 65 In these states,
changes to pension plans cannot result in less desirable benefits for the employee, because such a
modification would violate the contractual obligation created by the plan. 66 In New York, this
protection is codified in the state constitution, which explicitly provides, “membership in any
pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” 67 While New York’s
broad protection provides that pension plans cannot be changed if they lessen the employee’s
benefits in some way, it does not limit employers from changing other conditions that may
adversely affect pension benefits. 68
Second, a state may provide constitutional protection of only past benefit accruals. 69
Under this approach, followed by Michigan, Hawaii, and Louisiana, earned benefits are
protected, but future benefits are not. 70 The interpretation of this protection may mean that an
employee does not have the right to benefits he would acquire through continued work (and thus,

63

Id. at 36.
Monahan, supra note 49, at 7.
65
Id. at 28-30.
66
Id. at 7.
67
N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7.
68
For example, an employer may reduce an employee’s salary. Lippman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewanhaka Cent.
High Sch. Dist., 487 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1985).
69
Monahan, supra note 49, at 10.
70
Id. at 10-11.
64
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conditions of a pension plan may be altered freely so long as the changes take place in the
future), or that an employee only has rights to past benefits that were earned while vested in the
plan. 71
Finally, a state may not rely on its state constitution as a source of protection, and instead
treat pensions as deferred compensation as a term of the employment contract. 72 The majority of
jurisdictions treat pension benefits as a contractual obligation and adhere to an analysis based in
contract theory, though it is similar to the Constitutional analysis. 73 The balancing test has three
elements, and proposes to weigh the state’s police power with the interests of the employee to
get the benefit of their bargain. 74 The analysis considers 1) the existence and scope of the
contract; 2) whether the contract has been substantially impaired; and 3) whether the impairment
is reasonable and necessary to satisfy an important public purpose. 75 The first element examines
whether there is a binding agreement and to what extent the parties are bound. 76 For the second
element, different jurisdictions have found that formula changes, changes to funding
methodology, and elimination of cost-of-living adjustments constitute substantial impairments. 77
For the third element, a court may determine the reasonableness of the impairment based on
intent, foreseeability, and the extent of the resulting change. 78 To determine necessity, “a [s]tate
is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a par with
other policy alternatives . . . a [s]tate is not free to impose a drastic impairment when an evident

71

Id. at 11.
Id.
73
Martinez, supra note 52.
74
Id.
75
Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983).
76
Id.
77
See Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614 (1978); Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Bd.
of Admin. v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541 (Neb.
1995).
78
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 2, 27, 35 (1977).
72
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and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well.” 79 Additionally, the state must
show that it could not have achieved its purpose without the change to the contract. 80
Some courts have held that, notwithstanding the three-part test, an impairment may still
be constitutional if it is accompanied by some kind of new advantage. 81 Indeed, Colorado calls
this theory the “partial vesting” approach, and maintains that the accompanying advantage must
be: (1) of a beneficial nature; (2) actuarially necessary; or (3) strengthens and improves the
pension plan. 82 Additionally, while some jurisdictions allow unilateral modifications of pension
plans, this rule conflicts with most contract law. 83 Moreover, some jurisdictions hold that there is
no contractual right to a particular amount of funding, so any diminution or impairment by
pension law will not constitute breach. 84
1. Case Law Under Contract Clause Analysis
In the seminal case, Dodge v. Board of Education of Chicago, 85 the Supreme Court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint that the Miller Law, which decreased pension payments to
retired public school teachers in Chicago and applied retroactively and prospectively, was
unconstitutional, pursuant to the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.86 The Court declared
that “[t]he presumption is that such a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested
rights, but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the Legislature shall ordain otherwise.” 87
The Court further implied that the presumption will only be rebutted if there is some explicit
79

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 29-30.
81
Monahan, supra note 49 at 18.
82
Martinez, supra note 52, citing Peterson v. Fire and Police Pension Ass'n, 759 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1988).
83
In Alaska, Delaware, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, courts permitted unilateral modification “(1) in
order to enhance actuarial soundness; or (2) if the change bears a material relation to the purpose of the system and
if the resultant disadvantage to the employee is accompanied by an offsetting advantage.” However, Martinez
acknowledges that this analysis may contradict U.S. Trust Co. Id.
84
Fletcher, supra note 54.
85
Dodge v. Bd. of Educ.of Chi., 302 U.S. 72 (1937).
86
Id. at 75.
87
Id. at 72.
80
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language in the text of the legislation that indicates existence of a contract, or if circumstances
illustrate a clear legislative intent to create a contractual obligation. 88
While Dodge lays the foundation for analysis, courts that adopt the contract approach are
loosening the reins. Many jurisdictions will declare legislation unconstitutional if it applies
retroactively. In Andrews v. Anne Arundel County, 89 former county officials sought recovery and
injunctive relief, pursuant to the Contract Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against legislation,
which retroactively reduced pension benefits, the purpose of which was to cut costs. 90 The court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on both counts. 91 They found that case law supported contractual
rights in pension plans for vested participants and that the legislation created a substantial
impairment because the elected and appointed officials relied on the terms of the contract. 92
Additionally, the court held that although the purpose of saving costs was important, the County
did not show that the means taken were the least drastic available. 93
In Mascio v. Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio, 94 plaintiff, Judge John
Mascio, who was collecting retirement benefits while simultaneously earning a full salary as an
elected official, brought a claim against Ohio’s public retirement system after it enacted an
amendment to prevent “double-dipping.” 95 The amendment would force a retiree in plaintiff’s
position to receive his salary and postpone receiving his pension benefits. 96 The Sixth Circuit
held that Mascio was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the State, because under Ohio
law, once an individual’s rights have vested in his pension, the benefits cannot retroactively be

88

Id. at 79.
Andrews v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 931 F. Supp. 1255 (D.Md. 1996).
90
Id. at 1257.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 1265.
93
Id. at 1266.
94
Mascio v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 1998).
95
Id. at 311-12.
96
Id. at 312.
89
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withheld. 97 Because Mascio’s pension was vested and he had begun receiving benefits before the
amendment was enacted, the State’s forfeiture of his benefits constituted a Contract Clause
violation. 98
Some jurisdictions, however, still adhere to the Dodge analysis, and are hesitant to find a
contractual obligation. In Parker v. Wakelin, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s holding
that amendments to the Maine State Retirement System violated the Contract Clause with regard
to vested members of the system. 99 The Maine Education Association challenged the legislation,
which did not affect those individuals already receiving benefits under the system, under the
Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Takings Clause. 100 The First Circuit could not engage
in the full analysis under the Contract Clause because they could not establish the existence of a
contract from the legislation under the “unmistakability doctrine.” 101 Similar to the standard
expressed in Dodge, the unmistakability doctrine presumes that legislation does not create a
contractual obligation. 102
Parker is careful to point out that although many jurisdictions have drifted from the
gratuity approach and adopted some version of the contract approach, a qualified approach is
most appropriate. The Ninth Circuit adopted such an approach: “[t]he ‘better reasoned view’
recognizes that non-vested employees have contractual rights in pension plans ‘subject to
reasonable modification in order to keep the system flexible to meet changing conditions, and to
maintain the actuarial soundness of the system.’” 103

97

Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
99
Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
100
Id. at 3.
101
Id. at 5.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 6 (quoting Nev. Emp. Ass’n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990)).
98
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In Koster v. City of Davenport, the Court strongly implied that a contract was not created
by pension reform legislation in Iowa, but held that even if employees had a contract right in
their benefits, the legislation (which allowed municipalities discretion to use excess funds for
either employees’ or the city’s future contributions) did not substantially impair their rights. 104
In Robertson v. Kulongoski, 105 current and former public employees argued that recent
amendments to the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System violated the Contract
Clause. 106 Under the challenged 2003 legislation, employees would lose a variety of previous
benefits under the system, and lose annual cost-of-living adjustments. 107 While the Ninth Circuit
follows, for the most part, the traditional analysis under the Contract Clause, they make a
departure when qualifying that the relevant question under the first prong is not the existence of
the contract in general, but whether there was an agreement regarding specific terms. 108
Applying this standard, the Court found that the legislation did not create a contract in the
specific terms at issue, and thus, there was no violation. 109
iii. Promissory Estoppel
Under the theory of promissory estoppel, a promise that is otherwise not legally binding
will be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should reasonably expect the promisee to
rely on the promise and if the promisee did rely on the promise to his detriment. 110 Some states
reject the contract or gratuity approach and instead adopt some version of a promissory estoppel
theory. Minnesota, for example, has developed a test that determines that if there is 1) existence
of a clear and definite promise, 2) the promisor intended to induce reliance, and such reliance
104

Koster v. City of Davenport, 183 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. Iowa 1999).
Robertson v. Kulongoski, 466 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006).
106
Id. at 1115.
107
Id. at 1116.
108
Id. at 1117 (quoting Rui One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004)).
109
Robertson v. Kulongoski, 466 F.3d, at 1119.
110
Rest. 2nd of Contracts § 90 (1981).
105
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occurred, and 3) the promise must be enforced to prevent injustice, then the employee has the
right to enforce his promise. 111 Still, this theory is limited; as several federal cases have held, the
doctrine “conflicts with the rule that a surrender of reserved legislative powers is not to be
inferred but, rather, can only be effectuated by a clear and unambiguous expression of legislative
intent.” 112 Due to the nature of the analysis, litigation using a promissory estoppel approach will
have to go through a fact specific analysis for any case.
iv. Property Right
The rights in a public pension plan can be treated as property, and are protected under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (or state equivalents for due process). 113 Thus, under this
theory, when pension plans are reformed the legislation may qualify as unconstitutional if it is
viewed as a taking without just compensation. 114 Several states, including Connecticut,
Wisconsin, Maine, New Mexico, and Ohio follow this approach. 115
1. Case Law Under Property Right Analysis
Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York defined a factor-balancing test that
weighs government interests with the employee’s right to property. 116 The factors include: “[t]he
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant[,] ‘the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,]’ and ‘the character of the
governmental action.’” 117 The analysis from this seminal case informs other courts dealing with
Takings issues with pension reform challenges.
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Connecticut adopted the property right approach in Pineman v. Oechslin, 118 which
granted employees’ rights to retirement benefits after vesting. 119 The court explicitly held that a
state pension plan creates a property interest for all public employees, and employees’ interests
are protected from “arbitrary legislative action under the due process provisions of our state and
federal constitutions.” 120
In Parella v. Retirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement System, 121 retired
legislators claimed that capping benefits to comply with tax laws violated Takings, Contract, and
Due Process clauses. 122 Following their initial suit, Congress repealed the tax provision preceded
the pension reform law, and the State duly refunded the lost benefits. 123 Ultimately, the First
Circuit determined that because the retirees had no contractual right to the benefits, the claim for
a violation of the Takings Clause also failed, because the benefits could not be considered
property. 124
c. Federal Regulation
Generally, federal regulation does not control public employee benefits. 125 ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 govern private pension plans and benefits. 126 ERISA was
enacted in 1974, and broadly regulates pension plans and other benefits in the private sphere. 127
Specifically, ERISA controls the extent that information is accessible, fiduciary obligations are
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imposed upon those responsible for plans, and individuals are able to state grievances through
established processes. 128
While ERISA confers a defined scheme of protection for private employees, the Tax
Code provides certain incentives for various plans, particularly retirement plans. 129 To receive
the incentivized tax treatment, employers and employees must engage in a “qualified plan,”
which meets the specific requirements of the Code. 130 Such a plan must originate in the United
States, form a plan to exclusively benefit the employee, and satisfy the listed requirements under
I.R.C. § 401. 131 Should the plan fulfill these requirements, the Government will only tax the
employee when money is received from the plan, 132 the Government will not tax the employer’s
contribution, 133 the employer can immediately deduct his contributions for the taxable year, 134
and the Government will not tax the trust’s investment income. 135 For a tax benefit to apply,
however, the plan cannot be amended to decrease accrued benefits of any participant, under the
anti-cutback rule codified in I.R.C. § 411(d)(6). 136 The anti-cutback rule does not prevent
amendments that decrease accrued future benefits, and state plans are exempted from the rule. 137
Although ERISA and the Tax Code are the major elements of federal regulation of
pension benefits, § 302 of the National Labor Relations Act is also an important aspect of federal
protection, exclusively concerning collective bargaining agreements. 138 Although § 302 is less
expansive than other federal regulation, as a criminal statute it is strict in its enforcement of
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preventing employers from deceptively controlling their employees’ benefits through the
manipulation of union officials. 139
II. Background on Reform in New Jersey and the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation
The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation was signed into law by Governor Chris Christie
on June 28, 2011. 140 The bill passed after months of partisan turmoil, when the bill’s sponsor,
Senate President Stephen Sweeney (D-Gloucester), and Assembly Speaker Sheila Oliver (DEssex) pushed past their party’s majority sentiments to come to a compromise. 141 While many of
Governor Christie’s goals were met in the cost-cutting legislation, it seems that Sweeney and
Oliver were able to reach a meeting of the minds with some elements of the law. 142 For instance,
while the law imposes new provisions concerning health care contributions, they expire in four
years according to a sunset clause in the legislation. 143
However, NJ-CAN, a group formed in opposition to the reform bill, 144 petitioned for
removal of Sweeney and Oliver, alleging that they betrayed Democratic principles. 145 NJ-CAN
argued that the legislation destroys collective bargaining rights, and hopes to solicit members in
support of ousting “Christiecrats,” or Democrats who voted for the bill. 146 Oliver released
statement citing the sunset clause as a rebuttal to “destruction” of bargaining rights. 147
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Still, strong words from Assembly Majority Leader Joseph Cryan (D-Union) days before
the bill was enacted indicate the sharp division on the issue. 148 New Jersey unions also expressed
opposition to the bill.149 Barbara Keshishian, president of the New Jersey Education Association
(NJEA), stated that the changes in the law would be especially detrimental to public educators,
as it could require an average contribution of fourteen percent from a teacher’s salary. 150
While the NJEA and other unions have engaged in protests before the bill passed and
initiated litigation challenging the bill, they also hoped to express their discontent at the
legislative elections in November 2011. 151 Ultimately, election results were favorable for
Democrats, who gained a seat in the state Legislature. 152 However, intra-party discontent was not
absent from the election. Prior to the election, Senate President Sweeney defended his support of
the law, claiming, “no one in the last 10 years has advanced more pro-labor legislation than I
have. At the same time . . . I am also responsible to the taxpayers of this state.” 153 Sweeney faced
little opposition as a result of his involvement with the passing of the reform. 154 However,
Assembly Speaker Sheila Oliver faced great opposition as a result of her support of the law, and
allegedly won her second term by coming to a compromise thanks to “Democratic power
brokers.” 155
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The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation affects public education employees, state judges,
police and firemen, and other public employees. 156 The law establishes new committees for some
of the pension systems, whose members will be appointed both by the Governor and by
unions. 157 After meeting a “target funded ratio,” 158 the committees may modify contribution
rates, eligibility requirements, disability benefits, and may reinstate cost of living adjustments. 159
The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation increases employee contributions from 5.5% to
6.5%, and then to 7.5% after seven years 160 for TPAF and PERS. 161 Contribution rates will
increase from 3% to 12% for JRS, phased in over the next seven years. 162 Members of PFRS,
and prosecutors of PERS will pay a 10% contribution rate, increased from 8.5%. 163 Finally,
members of SPRS will pay an increased rate of 9%, from 7.5%. 164
Furthermore, public employees joining TPAF or PERS must accumulate thirty years of
work and reach the age of 65 to retire, while members enrolled before November 1, 2008 may
retire at age 60, and member enrolled between November 1, 2008 and June 28, 2011 may
become eligible at age 62. 165 New PFRS members will receive 60% of final compensation, rather
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than 65% upon retirement. 166 The law also eliminates the provision of law allowing a member of
PERS or PFRS from retiring and receiving benefits while still maintaining a position in an
elective public office and receiving full salary for the position, unless his retirement is based
exclusively on that position. 167
Finally, the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation eliminates the cost-of-living adjustment for
current and future retirees and beneficiaries, unless it is reactivated as permitted by the bill. 168
While cost-of-living adjustments will not be provided unless reactivated by the system
committees, those benefits that have been granted to retirees prior to the law will not be
reduced. 169
The law also provides that although the amortization method for the system’s unfunded
liability will change for PERS, TPAF, SPRS, PFRS, and JRS, employers for those members will
be contractually obligated to pay the required annual contributions to prevent underfunding. 170
The law also provides that employees may bring a breach of contract claim should his employee
fail to pay these required contributions in the Superior Court, Law Division.
Current and new public employees and some public retirees will pay increased
contributions for health care, not less than 1.5% of their compensation. 171 Provisions for health
care benefits become effective at varying times, according to collective bargaining agreements,
and will expire four years after they become effective. 172 The bill explicitly provides that
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“increased employee contributions . . . for pension benefits and the contributions for health care
benefits will begin upon the implementation of necessary administrative actions for collection
and will not be applied retroactively to this bill’s effective date.” 173 Thus, while the law does
propose many changes, it does not purport to alter the rights of those public employees who have
already earned their benefits.
While goals of the reform are articulated in the text of the legislation, there is evidence
supporting alternative purposes as well. According to the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation, the
changes that are set forth are necessary to comply with the Internal Revenue Code and
Statements Numbers 43 and 45 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. Additionally,
the legislation must comply with the Accounting and Financial Reporting by Employers for
Postemployment Benefits Older than Pensions and the U.S. Department of Treasury regulations
under 403(b) of Internal Revenue Code, pertaining to the Supplemental Annuity Collective
Trust. 174 Seemingly, the reform was enacted in order to meet accounting, financial, and taxrelated standards set forth by the Government.
Coincidentally, some sources indicate that while the reform may be necessary to comply
with these regulations, it was also fueled by the necessity to reduce state expenditures. The
Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee testified that increased state employee
contributions to pensions could produce $3.9 billion in savings by 2021, and $120 billion by
2041. 175 Additionally, the Department of the Treasury predicted that the increases in health care
contributions will provide $10 million to New Jersey, and $5 million to local boards of education
and government. 176 By 2021, these savings could increase to $1.4 to 1.6 billion. 177 However, the
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New Jersey Education Association and other unions allege, in their August 31, 2011 Complaint
against the State, that the provisions for increased contributions and elimination of the cost-ofliving adjustment were established to remedy underfunding that had been going on since the
1997 amendments. 178

III. Proposal for Adoption of Uniform Contract Approach to Pension Reform in New
Jersey
Approaches to pension reform vary across the United States, creating uncertainty for
policy makers, employers, and employees alike. In New Jersey, the recent legislation highlights
the problems that result from such a lack of uniformity. An analysis of the policy of the
legislation, the subsequent New Jersey litigation, and the likely outcome of that litigation will
show that the state should adopt a clear, contractual approach to pension reform, which only
alters terms prospectively, rather than retroactively. As a result, future legislation will allow
employees to easily understand their rights. Additionally, future legislation will withstand
potential challenges under the Contract Clause.
a. Policy
As a threshold issue, it is necessary to ascertain whether the 2011 Pension Reform
Legislation can stand in whole or in part. There are many aspects of the legislation that are
generally not in dispute. In particular, provisions that apply prospectively will likely stand
against litigation or other challenges, based on the success of past reform in New Jersey.
Increased contribution rates for current and new employees, increased retirement age, and
increased healthcare contributions would most likely survive primarily the changes do not
threaten retirees’ earned benefits. Even outside of New Jersey, litigation challenging pension
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reform has not succeeded on terms altering contribution amounts and other prospective terms. 179
Finally, the committees established by the legislation have the authority, once the target funded
ratios are achieved, to alter the contribution percentages. This flexibility written into the law
further reduces the likelihood that these aspects of the legislation would fail under litigation.
However, some aspects of the legislation are more likely to fall under scrutiny, and
moreover, arguably should not stand. Specifically, the elimination of the cost of living
adjustments poses distinct problems. First, the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation eliminates cost
of living adjustments for new and current public employees and current public retirees. The fact
that the law repeals benefits earned by retirees bolsters a Contract Clause based argument. Some
cases outside of New Jersey support this inference, but New Jersey case law has not yet dealt
with such a circumstance. 180 Further, the Ninth Circuit refused to find that elimination of cost of
living adjustments constituted a violation under a progressive analysis, and New Jersey has
exhibited deference to the Legislature. 181 While other states may have a harder time successfully
passing or maintaining reform on this issue, it seems likely that New Jersey will be able to retain
this part of the 2011 legislation. The ambiguity of New Jersey pension reform legislation and
common-law treatment of pension reform burdens employers and employees alike. As such, by
adopting a uniform contractual approach to pension reform, parties will understand their
obligations and rights to benefits.
b. Litigation Outlook in New Jersey
Although many states seem to adopt the contract approach, or at least modified versions
of it, New Jersey has shifted little from its stance in Spina. Should a federal court have to apply
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New Jersey state law, it seems that it would have to defer to legislative intent, rather than adopt a
more liberal stance adopted by many of the circuit courts.
Judge Paul DePascale, who sits in Hudson County Superior Court, brought his claim
against the State for the changes to the Judicial Retirement System in July 2011. 182 DePascale’s
case was recently decided by Superior Court Judge Linda Feinberg on October 17, 2011. 183
DePascale argued that the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation violates Article VI, section six,
paragraph six 184 of the New Jersey Constitution, which protects judges from reduced
compensation, as his biweekly contributions to JRS would increase from “$126.44 to
$697.59.” 185 The opinion indicates that “salaries” and “compensation” have no significant
disparity under that section, rebutting defendant’s claim that pension benefits, typically regarded
as compensation, were not governed by the New Jersey Constitution. 186
Furthermore, Judge Feinberg notes that in every previous amendment before the 2011
Pension Reform Legislation, increases in contribution rates were accompanied by an increase in
salary that made up for the loss. 187 Although the Court recognized New Jersey’s precedential
deference to legislation, it held that the 2011 Pension Reform Legislation lowers plaintiff’s
salary without offering a substitute increase by increasing contribution rates, thus violating New
Jersey’s Compensation Clause. 188 While Judge Feinberg’s holding may indicate that New Jersey
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is showing less deference to legislative enactments, it is important to point out that plaintiff
succeeded under a constitutional source explicitly protecting his right to pension benefits.
Several unions and individuals filed suit following the enactment of the 2011 Pension
Reform Legislation. In their complaint, dated August 31, 2011, The New Jersey Education
Association, New Jersey State Policemen’s Benevolent Association, Communications Workers
of America, AFL-CIO and others alleged violations of the State Contract Clause, Due Process
Clause, and Promissory Estoppel. 189 Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the elimination of the costof-living adjustment violates their non-forfeitable right to the benefit. 190 Additionally, they argue
that the benefits current employees, vested participants, and retirees would receive under the
system are guaranteed as property interests.
While previous cases in New Jersey indicate a commitment to rejecting the contract
approach, DePascale illustrates that because of the extent of the modifications included in the
2011 Pension Reform Legislation, as compared to previous legislation, may not withstand the
traditional analysis. Thus, while the latest litigation cannot rely on a direct constitutional source
of protection, it may have a better chance of success because of the drastic nature of the law.
Still, unlike the majority of jurisdictions where pension benefits are treated squarely as
contractual rights, New Jersey has consistently held that the Legislature is free to alter the
methods by which pension plans are managed, despite the fact that employees have a contractual
right to receive some sort of payment.
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On December 12, 2011, Judge Anne Thompson granted Legislative defendants New
Jersey Senate and New Jersey Assembly’s motion to dismiss on procedural grounds. 191 More
recently, Judge Thompson granted the State of New Jersey, Governor Chris Christie, and New
Jersey Treasurer Andrew Sidamon-Eristoff their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. 192
The plaintiffs are planning to appeal, as Judge Thompson did not reach the merits of the case. 193
Conclusion:
The 2011 Pension Reform Legislation sets many changes to New Jersey’s public pension
system into motion. As a result, many public employees have voiced their opposition in the
public arena and through the courts. By examining various approaches to pension plans in a legal
framework, detailing the specific aspects of the recent reform, and analyzing relevant litigation,
it is unclear how New Jersey will ultimately handle the challenge to the constitutionality of the
reform. It is evident, however, that public employees in New Jersey are taking the opportunity to
alter the judiciary’s treatment of pension rights. The court’s initial decision to grant defendant
legislators’ motion to dismiss illustrates the increasing likelihood that New Jersey will continue
to grant deference to the Legislature concerning pension reform. However, to avoid inefficiency,
lack of transparency, and uncertainty, the Legislature should execute future reform exclusively
prospectively.
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